Chapter 4.D.3--Affirmative Defenses

For a thorough analysis that applies Schneider v. Revici and related doctrines to patients' cost-motivated refusals of optimal care, see Mark Hall & Carl Schneider, When Patients Say No (To Save Money): An Essay on the Tectonics of Health Law, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 743 (2009).

The Oklahoma supreme court ruled that a physician who responded to a hospital patient's code blue emergency is immune from liability under the Good Samaritan law.  Gomes v. Hameed, 184 P.3d 479 (Okla. 2008).

Arguing for more liability protection of physicians who respond to public health emergencies, such as bioterrorism or a flu pandemic, see Sharona Hoffman, Responders ' Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 Georgetown L. J. 1913 (2008).

Chapter 4.D.4  -- Arbitration and Waiver

On arbitration, see, Kenneth DeVille, The Jury is Out: Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitrartion Agreements for Medical Malpractice Claims, 28 J. Leg. Med. 333 (2007).

For thorough economic analyses mostly opposing the ability to alter the standard of care by contract, see Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over liability: medical malpractice and the cost of choice, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 957-1023 (2010) (classic economics); Tom Baker & Timothy Lyton, Allowing Patients to Waive the Right to Sue for Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and Sunstein 104 Nw. U. L. REV. ___ (2010) (behavioral economics). 

Return to home page.